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Internet Search and Seizure in United States v. Forrester:
New Problems in the New Age of Pen Registers
I. INTRODUCTION
Katherine Kressman Taylor‘s well-known short story, ―Address
Unknown,‖ depicts two business associates and friends who are
corresponding through letters.1 Max is a Jew living in America and
conducting their shared business venture of selling artwork. The other
correspondent, Martin, lives in Nazi Germany and sympathizes with the
Nazi cause. Max becomes hostile after Martin refuses to hide Max‘s
younger sister Griselle from Nazi troops, and she is killed.2 In retaliation,
Max starts writing strange codes in his letters to Martin that appear as
numbers and names of paintings. The codes look highly suspicious and
are designed to make it appear as if Martin is a member of an
underground movement smuggling Jews out of the country. Martin
responds with confusion and asks Max to stop writing him the strange
letters because his mail is being monitored by the Nazi regime. 3 The
letters continue, becoming more frequent and extreme. Martin writes
back infuriated. He tells Max that he has no anti-Nazi sentiments and
feels that Max is trying to sabotage him. The story ends with a returned
letter from Max stamped ―addressee unknown,‖ implying that Martin had
been captured by the Nazi regime.4
Taylor‘s story is a depiction of the Nazi government‘s control over
civilian communication during its years of European domination. Other
governments have had similar authority to confiscate and search the
public‘s mail and other communication at will. The Framers of the
United States Constitution contemplated the danger of infringement of
freedom presented by governments with unbridled control over citizen
property and communication. The Framers wrote the Fourth Amendment
to protect the people against these abuses of government power and to
safeguard certain liberties:

1. Katherine Kressman Taylor, Address Unknown, in THE ELOQUENT SHORT STORY 232
(Lucy Rosenthal ed., 2004).
2. Id. at 250–51.
3. Id. at 252–55.
4. Id. at 256.
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized .

Although the example of government control in Taylor‘s story is an
extreme one, it illustrates the dangers of too much government
interference—interference that must be checked. The fine line between
public welfare and individual privacy has become much more attenuated
as the country‘s tools for accessing communication and information have
become more expansive. The innovation of the telephone and the
Internet has required modern legislatures to draw a line where
government control ends and individual privacy begins regarding
communication sent through channels provided by private corporations.
In 2008, United States v. Forrester presented a new question to the
judiciary regarding the search and seizure of private communication: can
law enforcement entities access IP numbers5 and email to and from
addresses used by a private citizen without first proving probable cause?6
While the Ninth Circuit answered in the affirmative,7 the Court‘s analysis
raises questions about the rectitude of the government accessing
channeling information in private communications.
Part II of this case note discusses the use of pen registers and the
history of their statutory regulation. Part III describes the facts of United
States v. Forrester. Part IV outlines the Court‘s reasoning in that case.
Part V discusses and argues against the Court‘s holding that channeling
information falls outside a citizen‘s reasonable expectation of privacy.8
Part VI disputes the Court‘s assertion that the seizure of IP and email
to/from addresses does not violate a citizen‘s right to keep the contents of
communications private.

5. IP numbers are ―[t]he numerical sequence that serves as an identifier for an Internet
server. An IP address appears as a series of four groups of numbers separated by dots. The first
group is a number between 1 and 255 and the other groups are a number between 0 and 255, such as
192.135.174.1. Every server has its own unique address.‖ Dictionary.com, s.v. ―IP Address,‖
available at http://dictionary.reference.com /browse/IP%20Address (last visited Dec. 21, 2007).
6. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008).
7. Id. at 1050.
8. Id. at 1048.
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II. PEN REGISTERS AND THE HISTORY OF THEIR REGULATION
Pen registers record or decode ―dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling information‖9 transmitted through telecommunications carriers
like telephone companies and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Pen
registers were originally used to record the telephone numbers dialed to
and from a particular phone.10 However, in 2001 the US Patriot Act
broadened this definition to include devices that could track routing
information over the Internet.11
Statutes and case law have established protections against the seizure
of telephone and Internet communications. Under 18 U.S.C.A. §2511,
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), it is illegal for
employees of these telecommunications carriers to intercept and disclose
any wire, oral, or electronics communications including routing
information.12 However, telecommunications carriers are required to
carry pen registers or similar technology that allow the interception of
wire and electronic communications upon the issue of a court order.13
In the past, government agents who applied for such a court order
had to prove probable cause. In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court
stated that search and seizure does not apply only to physical property. It
can apply to other communications including communication transmitted
through a telephone.14 Generally, probable cause is required in order to
clear the constitutional bar for search and seizure.15 This standard was
reflected in Title III, the Federal Wiretap Act, which set procedures for
authorization of surveillance of oral, wire, and electronic
communications.16 This Act required a showing of probable cause before
9. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing use of A Pen Register and Trap on
(XXX) Internet Service Account/User Name, (xxxxxxxx@xxx.com), 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 47 (D.
Mass. 2005) [hereinafter Pen Register Application] (A pen register is ―a device or process which
records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided,
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication.‖); see also 47
U.S.C.A. § 1002; 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121–27.
10. Pen Register Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
11. Id.; see also Deborah F. Buckman, Allowable Use of Federal Pen Register and Trap and
Trace Device to Trace Cell Phones and Internet Use, 15 A.L.R. FED. 2d 537 (2006).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) (―. . . a person or entity providing an electronic communication
service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication . . . while in
transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended recipient of
such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.‖).
13. 47 U.S.C.A. §1002 (a)(1)–(2).
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
15. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 58 (2008).
16. Electronic Privacy Information Center (Nov. 17, 2005), http://epic.org/privacy
/terrorism/usapatriot/ [hereinafter EPIC]; see also Center for Democracy and Technology,
Government Surveillance, The Nature and Scope of Governmental Electronic Surveillance Activity,
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a court order was issued authorizing government surveillance.17
However, the standard of ‗probable cause‘ was diminished by
amendments effectuated by the US Patriot Act, which removed Title III
and the ECPA‘s requirement of showing probable cause. Under the
Patriot Act, the government only has to show that ―the information likely
to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation.‖18 This sudden easing of the government‘s burden
of proof has caused a fair amount of criticism from civil liberties
groups19 and even from some members of the legislature.20
Under case law, communicative content known as ―routing
information‖ has always been devoid of the requirement to prove
probable cause. In Smith v. Maryland the United States Supreme Court
found that traditional Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to
telephone routing information (like telephone numbers) because of the
caller‘s lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in those numbers and
because this information does not constitute ―content.‖21 United States v.
Forrester extended this reasoning to pen registers surveying the Internet.
However, this extension poses problems because information collected
by pen registers, including IP addresses and email to and from addresses,
are qualitatively different than typical routing information. Internet users
who use IP addresses and email to and from addresses have a higher
expectation of privacy in that content than in telephone numbers.
(July 2006), http://www.cdt.org/wiretap/wiretap_overview.html.
17. EPIC, supra note 16; see also Center for Democracy and Technology, Government
Surveillance, The Nature and Scope of Governmental Electronic Surveillance Activity, (July 2006),
http://www.cdt.org/wiretap/wiretap_overview.html.
18. US Patriot Act §216(a)(1)(2001).
19. The Electronic Privacy Information Center is one group who have actively opposed the
US Patriot Act. Electronic Privacy Information Center website, http://epic.org/epic/about.html
(―EPIC is a public interest research center in Washington, D.C. It was established in 1994 to focus
public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and
constitutional values.‖).
The following comes from the EPIC website:
The events of September 11 convinced . . . overwhelming majorities in Congress that law
enforcement and national security officials need new legal tools to fight terrorism. But we
should not forget what gave rise to the original opposition – many aspects of the bill
increase the opportunity for law enforcement and the intelligence community to return to
an era where they monitored and sometimes harassed individuals who were merely
exercising their First Amendment rights. Nothing that occurred on September 11
mandates that we return to such an era.
EPIC, supra note 16 (quoting John Podesta, USA Patriot Act—The Good, the Bad, and the Sunset,
29 HUM. RTS. MAG. 3, 4 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/winter02/podesta.html
(last visited Jan. 21, 2008)).
20. EPIC, supra note 16.
21. Smith v Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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Additionally, IP addresses and email to and from addresses and are more
suggestive of content than telephone numbers.
III. THE FACTS OF UNITED STATES V. FORRESTER
The defendants in United States v. Forrester, Mr. Forrester and Mr.
Alba, were convicted of conspiring to create an Ecstasy-manufacturing
operation. Evidence introduced at trial showed that they created a large
laboratory to be housed in an insulated sea-land container.22 Documents
presented by the government showed that the laboratory would have
created 440 kilograms of Ecstasy, which would produce an estimated
profit of ten million dollars a month.23 Alba purchased chemicals for
producing the Ecstasy and Forrester met with a Swedish chemist in
Stockholm to learn how to produce the drug.24
Government agents employed computer surveillance technologies,
including a pen register25 and trap and trace devices,26 to track email and
Internet activity of the defendants.27 The surveillance tools were
employed through the defendant‘s Internet Service Provider (ISP),
PacBell.28 The surveillance began after the Court authorized the
investigators to install a pen register to Alba‘s account.29 The
government was able to see the to/from addresses of those whom Alba
emailed.30 The government was also able to access the IP addresses of
Internet sites that Alba accessed.31 This provided the government with
the home pages of the websites visited by Alba. An IP address is distinct
from a URL32 because an IP address does not show the particular page of
the website that the individual is accessing.33 The monitoring results
22. United States v. Forrester, 512 F. 3d 500, 506 (9th Cir. 2008).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. For the definition of pen register, see supra note 9.
26. A ―trap and trace device . . . captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which
identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing and signaling information
reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, however,
that such information shall not include the contents of any communication.‖ Pen Register
Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 47 (D. Mass. 2005).
27. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 505.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Pen Register Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
32. A URL means ―Uniform Resource Locator: a protocol for specifying addresses on the
Internet,‖ Dictionary.com, s.v. ―URL,‖ http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/URL (last visited
Mar. 12, 2008). It is ―an Internet address (for example, http://www.hmco.com/trade/), usually
consisting of the access protocol (http), the domain name (www.hmco.com), and optionally the path
to a file or resource residing on that server (trade).‖ Id.
33. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 at 510.
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showed that Alba had sent several emails to Forrester and had accessed
certain chemical websites.34 Based on these results and other pieces of
evidence, Forrester and Alba were convicted of conspiracy to
manufacture and distribute ecstasy.35 Alba appealed on the ground that
the government‘s surveillance of his Internet activity violated his Fourth
Amendment right against search and seizure.36
IV. THE COURT‘S REASONING
The Ninth Circuit held that government surveillance of IP addresses
and email to and from addresses does not violate a private party‘s Forth
Amendment rights.37 The Court found that individuals do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in IP addresses and email to and from
addresses. It also held that this is routing information, not content (which
is protected under Supreme Court precedent). The Court cited the
Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Smith v. Maryland to support its holding.
A. The Court Holds IP Addresses and Email To and From Addresses
Have No Expectation of Privacy
Under the Fourth Amendment, an action does not constitute a search
if there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.38 In Smith v. Maryland,
the Supreme Court determined that the use of a pen register to track
which phone numbers were dialed from a particular residence was not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment because, upon turning this
information over to a telephone company, an individual no longer has an
―expectation of privacy.‖39 The Court reasoned that, ―a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over
to third parties.‖40
The Court reasoned that individuals know that employees at phone
companies have access to and must use channeling information such as
telephone numbers to place phone calls. Individuals who use the phone,
therefore, waive their right to privacy over that channeling information
by freely handing it over to the telephone company.41 The Court in
34. Id.
35. Id. at 506.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 513.
38. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983); Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526
(Nev. 2002).
39. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751–52 (1979).
40. Id. at 743–44.
41. Id. at 742.
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Forrester used the same reasoning to hold that individuals who use the
Internet have no expectation of privacy because they freely relay IP
addresses and email to and from addresses to ISPs to enable the ISP to
run the information through the right servers in order to send email
messages or access the website.42
B. The Court Holds IP Addresses and Email To and From Addresses
Are Not Communicative Content
The Court also cited the Supreme Court‘s comment that the use of
pen registers without a warrant is constitutional because the registers
cannot access the content of the communications.43 Under Supreme
Court precedent in Katz v. United States, communicative content cannot
be accessed by the government unless the government first obtains a
warrant.44 The Court said that the government surveillance in this case
was similar to that of Smith.45 In Smith, the Court found that telephone
numbers are routing information and do not consist of the content of a
communication and are, therefore, immune to the restrictions set in
Katz.46 The Forrester Court found that email to and from addresses and
IP addresses are analogous to telephone numbers because they are
routing information and government officials accessing this information
would be unable to view the content of the email messages or websites.47
C. The Outcome of Forrester
Thus, the Forrester Court held that because there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in IP and email to and from addresses that are
freely given to an ISP, and because pen registers do not enable the
government to view the contents of the emails or websites, there was no
search, and Fourth Amendment protections do not apply.48 Therefore, the
evidence the government gathered through the pen register and presented
at trial did not need to be suppressed.49

42. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2008).
43. Id.
44. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding there is a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the contents of a telephone conversation).
45. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509.
46. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
47. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509–10.
48. Id. at 510.
49. Id.
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V. DO INDIVIDUALS HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
IN IP ADDRESSES AND EMAIL TO AND FROM ADDRESSES?
In order for information to be covered under the Fourth Amendment,
a plaintiff must prove both that she had an expectation of privacy and
that this expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.50 Although judicial precedent is somewhat limited in the area
of Internet communications, the courts have held that certain types of
Internet communications enjoy an expectancy of privacy while others do
not. Before Forrester, no other circuit court had addressed the issue of IP
addresses and email to and from addresses. However, there are strong
policy reasons why this particular type of information should enjoy an
expectancy of privacy.
A. Historical Court Treatment of Internet Communications and the
Reasonable Expectancy of Privacy
In the area of Internet communications, courts have held that there
are many types of communications that do have a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Courts have held that the content of email communications
are protected because there is a reasonable expectation of privacy when
those emails are stored with, or sent through, a commercial Internet
Service Provider (ISP).51 The Court in United States v. Maxwell held that
people sending and receiving real time messages, like instant messages,
have a reasonable expectancy of privacy because once the message is
sent it is lost forever.52 The Court analogized these real time messages to
telephone conversations which are clearly covered by the Fourth
Amendment.53 A confidentiality agreement provided by the ISP, while
not guaranteeing a constitutional expectation of privacy, is strong
evidence that the user had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
online communications.54
On the other hand, courts have held there is not a reasonable
expectation of privacy when an individual has accessed the Internet at
the place of her employment.55 Also, there is no expectation of privacy
on university computers or networks56 or on a city network without
50. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740; see also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
51. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417–18 (C.A.A.F. 1996); see also Warshak v.
United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007).
52. Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 418.
53. Id. at 469–71.
54. Id. at 417.
55. See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000).
56. See United States v. Butler, 151 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D. Me. 2001) (holding that there was
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password protection.57 Online bulletin boards58 and chat rooms59 also
have no expectation of privacy. Subscriber information, account
information, or other ―non-content‖ information conveyed to third parties
are viewed as destroying the privacy expectation as well.60
The courts have not articulated a test to determine what information
enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy. Courts make this
determination by looking at precedent and evaluating, on a case-by-case
basis, common sense arguments to determine whether ―. . . an intrusion
infringes upon constitutionally protected personal and societal values.‖61
B. Individuals Do Have a Reasonable Expectancy of Privacy with
Internet IP Addresses and Email Addresses
United States v. Forrester is the first circuit court case to address
whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy for
channeling information such as email to and from addresses and IP
addresses.62 The Court relied on Smith v. Maryland to hold that people
do not have a subjective expectation for privacy when they willfully give
information over to third parties such as telephone companies.63
However, there is evidence that many people don‘t believe they are
waiving their right to privacy when they transmit communications to
third party corporations. The dissenting opinions in Smith make this
assertion for telephone communications. Also, the common practice of
users and Internet service providers suggests that there is an even greater
expectation of privacy for Internet communications than for telephone
communications.

no legitimate expectation of privacy where a defendant downloaded child pornography using a
university‘s Internet capacity and stored the pornography on the computer‘s hard drive).
57. See United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007).
58. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001).
59. See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997);
Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 833 (Penn. 2001); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,
417 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
60. See United States v. D‘Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 (D. Mass. 2007); Freedman v.
American Online Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 182–83 (D. Conn. 2005); United States v. Sherr, 400 F.
Supp. 2d 843, 848 (D. Md. 2005); United States v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d 330, 332 (N.D. N.Y. 2002);
U.S. v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F.
Supp.2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va 1999); In re Property of Forgione, 908 A.2d 593, 607 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2006); House v. Com., 83 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 441–42
(2003).
61. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 20 (updated Dec. 2007); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); United States v. Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320
(8th Cir. 1991).
62. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008).
63. Id. at 509.
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1. The Smith dissenting opinions and their application to Internet
communication
The dissenting opinions in Smith suggest strong policy reasons for
why communications handed to third parties should retain some
expectation of privacy. These policy reasons support the assertion that
Internet communications, including IP addresses and email to and from
addresses, maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy.
In his dissenting opinion in Smith v. Maryland, Justice Marshall
stated that even assuming that individuals know that phone company
employees view the phone numbers they dial, ―it does not follow that
they expect this information to be made available to the public in general
or the government in particular. Privacy is not a discrete commodity,
possessed absolutely or not at all.‖64 Citizens regularly entrust personal
information to companies with the expectation that such information will
be kept confidential. Justice Marshall continued, ―Those who disclose
certain facts to a bank or a phone company for a limited business purpose
need not assume that this information will be released to other persons
for other purposes.‖65
Similar reasoning applies in Internet transactions. Just because an
individual hands sensitive information to a corporation, it does not
follow that the individual loses the expectation that this information will
be kept confidential. Credit card numbers, social security numbers, and
medical histories are just a few examples of information given to online
companies, accompanied by an expectation of privacy. Consumers
realize that some corporations, such as banks, hospitals, and insurance
companies, perform functions that consumers cannot perform for
themselves. In these situations consumers must give their private
information in order to receive these services. By sharing sensitive
information with the institutions, consumers do not indicate a reduced
expectation of privacy, but rather show trust in the corporation‘s
assurances of confidentiality.
Justice Marshall also criticized the Court‘s reasoning that an
individual who conveys information to these third parties ―assumes the
risk‖ of disclosure to the government.66 Justice Marshall stated that
assuming risk implies that the parties making the communication have a
choice.67 Individuals who place telephone calls don‘t have the option of
placing a call that doesn‘t go through a telephone company. Therefore,
64.
65.
66.
67.

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the only choice they have is either to make a call through a telephone
company and open their communications to government surveillance or
forgo making phone calls at all. This is an impracticable choice for, as
Justice Marshall said, making telephone calls is ―a personal and
professional necessity.‖68
The Court in Forrester created the same dilemma identified by
Justice Marshall in Smith. Under the Court‘s reasoning, users have to
choose between refraining from Internet usage or submitting to
government surveillance. In reality, this is not much of a choice. Like
telephone calls, the Internet has become a personal and professional
necessity. Few would, or arguably could, choose to forgo the benefits
provided by the Internet even if they were aware that they may be
watched. However, it is doubtful that individuals know they are opening
themselves to government surveillance every time they log onto the
Internet. Even assuming individuals were aware that their private
communications could be monitored by the government, this does not
mean individuals who use the Internet are consciously assuming a risk or
waiving their expectation of privacy since, as Justice Marshall said,
assuming risks requires a practicable choice.69
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Brennan, also dissented from the
Smith opinion. Stewart commented that the rationale used by the Smith
majority has no sound application. He stated that an individual not only
hands over telephone numbers to a company when making a call; the
individual also gives the company access to their phone conversations.70
Following the Court‘s line of reasoning—that anything handed to a third
party is no longer expected to be private—the government should have
access to the content of the individual‘s conversation as well: a position
which squarely conflicts with the Fourth Amendment.71
Stewart also cited Katz as holding that there is a greater expectation
of privacy depending upon the context in which the communication was
made. In Katz the Court stated that this expectation is greater if telephone
calls are made from private areas such as a telephone booth, one‘s home,
or one‘s office.72 Likewise, Internet communications are regularly made

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 746–47 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
71. Id.; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that there is a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the contents of a telephone conversation).
72. Id.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). The Court in Katz says, ―We have
never suggested that this concept [of constitutionally protected areas] can serve as a talismanic
solution to every Fourth Amendment problem.‖ However, in its reasoning the Court did regard the
context as a pertinent consideration in determining whether there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
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from one‘s home or private office. The Court in Forrester declined to
look at the objective circumstances surrounding the location of the
defendant when he made Internet communications and whether the
location would have suggested a greater expectation of privacy from the
user. It is likely that, since the pen register was installed on Alba‘s
personal PacBell account73, many of the Internet communications that
the government surveyed were in Alba‘s home. The Court, however,
chose to establish a standard that applies uniformly to all Internet
communications, regardless of their context.
These dissenting opinions present strong reasoning to rebut the
ruling of the majority‘s opinion in Smith (that communications handed to
third parties have no expectation of privacy). Likewise, these same
policy reasons, as expressed by the dissent, support the notion that
Internet communications, though given to third parties, should retain a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
2. Internet communication carries a stronger reasonable expectation of
privacy than telephone communications.
There are several differences between Internet communications and
telephone communications that suggest that individuals have a greater
expectation of privacy for their Internet communications. Many common
practices of Internet Service Providers and Internet users suggest this
greater expectation.
One such practice is privacy agreements. Many corporations, and
increasingly, online corporations, have privacy agreements assuring
customers that they will keep their information confidential. This added
assurance of security increases customer confidence, inducing many
individuals to overcome the fear of making transactions with personal
information released to the organizations. As acknowledged by the Court
in U.S. v. Maxwell, a privacy agreement is an indication that an
individual has a greater expectancy of privacy.74
Additionally, legislation such as the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA)75 gives the public more reason to expect privacy
when making a phone call or giving information over the Internet. The
Act provides that employees working for communication services cannot
obtain or divulge the contents of any communication.76 It also provides
73.
74.
75.
76.
service to

United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2511.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 3(a) ( ―A person or entity providing an electronic communication
the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication . . . while in
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that such information can only be acquired by obtaining a court order or
a warrant.77 This and other privacy legislation gives the public a
reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to their Internet
communications.
The practice of sending billing and use records is another difference
between phone companies and ISPs that suggest a higher expectation of
privacy. Professor Steven M. Bellovin,78 professor of computer science
at Columbia University, opined that the reasoning of the court in United
States v. Forrester is far too broad.79 He comments that the applicability
of pen registers to the Internet introduces several privacy problems that
do not exist with telephone corporations—problems that the Court in
Forrester does not address.80
Bellovin remarks that customers of telephone corporations regularly
receive telephone bills in the mail with a record of all of the telephone
numbers dialed throughout the month.81 These bills put the customer on
notice that the numbers are actually being recorded for corporate records.
In fact, the notice provided by monthly bills is something that the Court
in Smith identified as increasing the reasonable expectation of privacy.82
An ISP, on the other hand, does not give its customers such a record, so
the customer may be ignorant that such records exist. Bellovin believes
that the public is generally unaware of how ISPs work and that many
customers may believe that their routing information is kept far more
private when submitted through an ISP than when dialed through a
telephone corporation.83 Therefore, these individuals may have a
heightened expectation of privacy when they use the Internet.84
The Court in Forrester erred in presuming that the public has no
expectation of privacy when it hands private information to corporations.
Many consumers give confidential information to corporations with an
understanding that the corporation will keep it from being accessed by
private parties. This understanding is reflected in the ECPA. The Court
also failed to account for the potential differences in the public‘s
expectation of privacy for information given to telephone companies as
transmission on that service to any person or entity other than the addressee or intended recipient of
such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.‖).
77. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 2(a)(ii)(A)–(B).
78. Steven M. Bellovin biography (Feb. 15, 2008), http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
/informal-bio.html.
79. Steven M. Bellovin Blog, SMBlog for July 7, 2007, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
/blog/2007-07/2007-07-07.html [hereinafter Bellovin Blog].
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
83. Bellovin Blog, supra note 79.
84. Id.
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opposed to Internet routing information.85 These differences include the
public‘s lack of awareness that ISPs actually record their routing
information and the fact that some individuals don‘t use ISP‘s or other
corporations to route information through the Internet.
VI. ARE INTERNET IP ADDRESSES AND EMAIL TO AND FROM
ADDRESSES COMMUNICATIVE CONTENT?
The Court in Katz found that it was against the Fourth Amendment
for police to seize the contents of a telephone communication.86 This has
also been applied to the contents of Internet communication. For
example, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3121 limits the information that a government
agency may acquire through a pen register to ―dialing, routing,
addressing, and signaling information‖ and forbids obtaining the contents
of any wire or electronic communication.87 The Court in United States v.
Maxwell, explicitly ruled that there is an expectation of privacy in the
contents of emails stored by ISPs and that the government cannot access
the contents of these emails without first receiving a warrant.88 The Court
in United States v. Forrester stated that ―pen registers do not acquire the
contents of communications‖ and that the information the pen registers
do pick up (routing information such as Internet IP addresses and email
to and from addresses) are not content.89 The Forrester Court also said
that email to and from addresses and IP addresses are indistinguishable
from addresses on physical mail.90
However, unlike telephone numbers and addresses, the IP addresses
and email to and from addresses obtained by an Internet pen register may
contain information that suggests content. The Court in Smith v.
Maryland stated that pen registers installed on telephones do not convey
85. In cases regarding the Internet, the judiciary has very little precedent or statutory law to
apply. The Internet presents a whole new area of law where ―the terrain is unsettled‖ and ―[t]he
scholarly field studying these topics is still emerging.‖ John Palfrey, Berkman Center at Harvard
Law School, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/palfrey/2007/04/23/ (go to ―Key Themes of Internet, Law
and Politics 2007‖) (last visited January 21, 2008). Additionally, the inherent differences between
the Internet and other communication devices make it difficult for the court to faithfully analogize to
precedent.
86. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
87. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3121(c) (2001) (―A government agency authorized to install and use a pen
register or trap and trace device . . . shall use technology reasonably available to it that restricts the
recording or decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, and
signaling information utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or electronic
communications so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic communications.‖).
88. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (1996); see also Warshak v. United States, 490
F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007).
89. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2008).
90. Id. at 511.
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content because they ―. . . disclose only the telephone numbers that have
been dialed—a means of establishing communication. Neither the
purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the
call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed
by pen registers.‖91 Thus, a typical telephone pen register generally does
not reveal content. The types of pen registers used on ISP‘s, however,
have the potential of revealing much more content than a typical
telephone pen register.
Internet routing information is distinguishable from telephone
numbers and mailing addresses because it is more likely to reveal
content. In response to the increased government discretion regarding
Internet routing information that the US Patriot Act gives, the EPIC
states the following:
The fact that the provision prohibits the capture of ‗content‘ does not
adequately take into account the unique nature of information captured
electronically, which contains data far more revealing than phone
numbers, such as URLs generated while using the Web (which often
contain a great deal of information that cannot in any way be
92
analogized to a telephone number).

In In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing use of A Pen
Register and Trap on (XXX) Internet Service Account/User Name,
(xxxxxxxx@xxx.com) (Pen Register Application), the Court responds to
an application by the U.S. government to obtain the Court‘s permission
to use a pen register to monitor the Internet activity of four Internet
service accounts.93 The Court gives a brief history of pen registers,
writing that pen registers were typically used in telephone
communications and have only recently been used to obtain Internet
routing information.94 The Court explained that the use of pen registers
to track telephone communications are usually legal because they are
unable to track the contents of telephone conversations; however, using
pen registers to track Internet communications creates greater
problems.95 The Court listed a few potential situations where pen
registers, if not limited by the ISP, could record the contents96 of these
91. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (quoting United States v. New York Tel.
Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)).
92. EPIC, supra note 16.
93. 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46 (D.Mass. 2005).
94. A traditional ―pen register‖ only records telephone numbers. The court in this case also
refers to ―mirror ports.‖
95. Pen Register Application, 396 F.Supp.2d 45, 47–48 (D. Mass. 2005).
96. ―Contents,‖ under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), include ―. . .any information concerning the
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communications.97 Email ―subject lines‖ could be obtained through the
use of Internet pen registers, which would reveal the contents of the
communications.98 Problems would also arise if the user had put a search
term into Google or another search engine.99 The URL derived from the
IP address would contain the search words the individual used.100 This
would certainly alert the Government to the ―content‖ that the user was
seeking.101 The Court also commented that IP addresses themselves
would allow the government to determine the home page of the website
that the user under surveillance was accessing.102
The Court in Forrester acknowledged that the home page of a
website could be accessed simply by using the IP address.103 However,
the Court reasoned, the information derived from the IP address is
different from that of a URL.104 A URL would allow a user to find the
very webpage that the user under surveillance had accessed, whereas, the
IP address would only allow the government to view the home page of
the website and not the actual page the user was viewing. The Court used
the example of the New York Times website. A URL would take you to
a particular article while the IP address would only take you to
www.nytimes.com, the company‘s home page.105
However, despite the fact that access to only a home page tends to
reduce the ability of the government to access the specific content that
the user under surveillance accessed, viewing the home page would still
suggest that content. The general content of most web pages can be
suggested by viewing the home page. Viewing the home page of a site
that teaches someone how to cook French food would suggest that the
user wanted to get some French recipes. The home page of a site on how
to chemically manufacture ecstasy would imply that the individual was
seeking to make it himself. Allowing IP addresses like these into
evidence would implicate guilt for anyone, even individuals who may
have stumbled across sites like these inadvertently.
This suggestive content does not have the benign quality of typical
routing information like telephone numbers and mailing addresses.
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.‖
97. Pen Register Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 48–49.
98. Id. at 48.
99. Id. at 49.
100. Id. at 49.
101. Id. at 49.
102. Id. at 48. IP addresses, if typed into the web address bar, take a user to the home page of
the website that the user under surveillance was accessing.
103. United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2007).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Phone numbers and mailing addresses do not suggest the content of the
message. Instead, the information is directive in nature. Even if the
government agent intercepting this routing information were to discover
the communication‘s destination, this would reveal location and not
content. The Internet is unique in that the very form of its routing
information not only reveals location but, in some instances, reveals
content. It allows users to deliver and receive content from a specific
location but that location is typically labeled with a director or word that
describes the content of the site. While limiting the director to the home
pages restricts the government‘s ability to see exactly what the user was
viewing, it doesn‘t eliminate the problem that a home page typically
infers the type of content viewed by the user.
While this is most typically true with IP addresses, it can also occur
with email to and from addresses. Many times the local part of the
address or the domain name can reveal the nature of the contents of the
email. For instance, the email address for the admissions department at
Montana State University is admissions@montana.edu.106 An agent
reading this information recovered by a pen register could infer that this
communication involved a question involving admissions to Montana
University.
The Court in Pen Register Application stated that because IP
addresses are susceptible to revealing content, the court order to place a
pen register on a specific user account needs to limit the types of
information that an ISP can release to the government during
surveillance.107 In Forrester, the defense counsel made a motion to
discover the information obtained by the government with the pen
register on Alba‘s user account. The defense lawyer wanted the
application in order to see if the order had included restricting
instructions of the type required by the Court in Pen Register
Application. He requested the application because, according to his
expert—Marcus Lawson, a computer specialist and a former U.S.
Customs Special Agent—―. . . the intrusion on the computer traffic of
Mr. Alba was extensive‖ and suggested that Mr. Alba‘s ISP used the pen
register to obtain the content of Mr. Alba‘s Internet communications in
addition to routing information.108 The Court in Forrester did not go into
a discussion about the precise types of information gathered by the pen
register, which, according to Lawson, may have included content.

106. Montana State University information request page (Mar. 6, 2008),
http://www.montana.edu/wwwnss/need_info.shtml.
107. 396 F. Supp. 2d at 48–49.
108. United States v. Alba, 2006 WL 2967374, 11 (Mar. 8, 2006) (Brief for the Appellant).
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IP addresses and email to and from addresses are atypical because
rather than simply direct the reader to where the content is to be sent,
received, or viewed, they suggest the content of the communications
themselves. This is why the courts need to be cautious when analogizing
between typical routing information, like telephone numbers and mailing
addresses, and Internet routing information. Courts need to also be
cautious to include instructions limiting the amount of information to be
obtained from an ISP with a pen register as pen registers have the
capacity of revealing email subject lines and search terms.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court concluded their opinion in Forrester by stating that even
if the evidence obtained through the pen registers should have been
suppressed it would be a harmless error not to suppress. The Court
explained:
The evidence obtained through the computer surveillance was never
introduced at trial and was used only as a minor portion of the
government‘s application for a court order authorizing imaging and
keystroke monitoring. There was more than enough other evidence in
that application to generate probable cause even if the to/from
addresses of Alba‘s emails, the IP addresses he accessed and the
volume of data transmitted to or from his account had been suppressed.
The discussion of the computer surveillance . . . revealed only that Alba
109
had sent emails to Forrester and accessed certain chemical websites.

The results from the pen register, as well as the large amounts of
other evidence, made it clear that Alba and Forrester were guilty of
planning the ecstasy manufacturing operation. The Court‘s analysis in
this case clearly produced a just result. However, their reasoning may
endanger other defendants whose guilt is less apparent. The Court‘s
failure to recognize the inherent differences between telephone and
Internet communications may affect the ability of later courts to give
such defendants a just result.
The Court failed to acknowledge that most members of the public do
not consider giving private information to a corporate entity an invitation
to offer that information to the public or government officials. It also
failed to realize that although Smith found telephone numbers to have no
expectation of privacy, many individuals may have a higher expectation

109. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 513 (9th Cir. 2008).
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of privacy for information given electronically through ISPs than
telephone companies who record those numbers in a monthly bill.
Additionally, the Court failed to recognize that IP and email
addresses may be more suggestive of the content of the communication
than a telephone number. Telephone numbers do not contain information
such as the identity of the callers, the purport of the communication, nor
whether the call was even completed.110 In contrast Internet
communications received through a pen register may more specifically
identify the person who is making the communication, and may, if not
checked, reveal such information as email subject lines, home pages, and
search terms.
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110. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (citing United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
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